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Efficiency and risk management in banking
firms: A new method to decompose risk
José M. Pastor
Abstract
Traditional efficiency measures neglect bank risk and, even when risk is accounted for, do
not differentiate between the portion subject to managerial control (“internal”) versus the portion
that is exogenous and is part of a changing environment (“external”). This paper  proposes a new
sequential DEA procedure which decomposes a major indicator of bank risk --provision for loan
losses (PLL)-- into internal and external components. Our decomposition methodology is
contrasted with three alternatives to judge how different approaches to this problem may affect
the results. The analysis is illustrated by application to the Spanish banking system where
deregulation, imposed by the Single Market Program of the European Community, has affected
banks’ conduct in terms of efficiency and risk.
Key words: Risk, environment, DEA.
Resumen
Las medidas tradicionales de eficiencia no consideran el riesgo y aquellas que pretenden
incluir riesgo no distinguen la parte que sí es debida a la gestión empresarial (“interna”) de la parte
que es exógena a las empresas y que depende del ambiente económico (“externa”). En este
trabajo se propone un nuevo procedimiento DEA secuencial que descompone uno de los
principales indicadores de riesgo –las provisiones por prestamos de dudoso cobro (PLL)—en sus
dos componentes interno y externo. La metodología propuesta se contrasta con tres alternativas
diferentes para valorar si diferentes enfoques a la medición de este problema pueden afectar a los
resultados. El método se ilustra con una aplicación para el sistema bancario español, donde la
desregulación, impulsada por el Mercado Unico ha afectado a la conducta de los bancos en
términos de la eficiencia y riesgo.
Palabras clave: Riesgo, entorno, DEA.3
1. Introduction
Banking efficiency studies have proliferated over the last few years. The high quantitative
importance of the financial sector and its close interrelationship with the real sector of the
economy appears be the cause. Numerous advances have been realized, not only regarding
improvement in the techniques, but also in relation to the wide variety of aspects analyzed.
Though all the studies analyzed different aspects of banking sector and used different
techniques
1, all share a common interest: to judge the performance of financial institutions’
intermediation process by some indicator, generally efficiency.
While the traditional efficiency measures are usually considered good indicators of banks’
performance, other factors related to the assessment of financial institutions should be
considered. One of the most important is risk
2.
Thus, not only it is desirable that financial institutions be efficient, but also that they be
secure. While important in any sector of the economy, this is crucial to financial institutions, given
the high economic repercussions the collapse of a large bank could have on other banks.
However,  the interrelationship between risk and efficiency for banking firms has received little
attention in the banking literature. Only Berger and De Young (1995) (B&D), Hughes et al.
(1993, 1996) and Mester (1994a, 1994b) have examined this issue in any depth, and them usually
by adding some indicator of risk to the estimating process.
There are many aspects in which risk, usually measured thorough loan losses or problem
loans
3, are related to efficiency. All of them are comprehensively analyzed by B&D, who find a
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negative relation between cost efficiency and loan losses in bankrupt banks
4. B&D offer several
reasons for this result. First, inefficient banks, besides having poor internal cost control, may not
effectively screen loan applications. B&D call this (internal) negative relationship between cost
efficiency and loan losses as the "bad management” hypothesis. Secondly, loan losses can arise
from adverse economic circumstances, causing banks to spend more to recover the loans. This
external source of inefficiency B&D call the "bad luck” hypothesis. Alternatively, a positive
relationship between loan losses and efficiency could exist if some banks prefer not to spend
sufficient resources to review better loan applications so these banks would appear as efficient, at
least in the short term, and a positive relationship between loan losses and efficiency, called
"skimping” by B&D, would occur.
Despite B&D’s extensive analysis of this issue, their procedure, based on Granger-
causality analysis, does not allow the causes of loan losses to be assigned at the individual bank
level but rather only draws broad-based conclusions for the industry’s performance as a whole.
Besides, the general conclusions drawn will depend on the proportion of banks’ performance
falling into each hypothesis category and, because of this, all the hypotheses will be under-
evaluated, since banks do not perform homogeneously
5. Moreover, as B&D asserted, Granger-
causality methodology measures statistical associations that, while strongly implying economic
causation, do not necessarily prove it.
Current banking literature provides no work which decomposes loan losses or even
analyzes the origin of loan losses and, though some studies have tried to obtain efficiency risk-
adjusted efficiency measures specifying loan losses or problem loans directly within the estimation
structure
6,  the  method  used  to  do  so  is  inappropriate  for two reasons. First, these
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papers try to adjust the effect of loan losses (problem loans or provisions for loan losses) on
efficiency by including them directly in the model as an additional input. This procedure properly
characterizes those institutions which have poor quality assets and high loan loss ratios,
exclusively, due to poor risk management. However, those banks that assess risk correctly, but
which are influenced by adverse economic conditions, will be incorrectly shown as very
inefficient. If we wish to consider banks’ efficiency controlling by risk, only those loan losses
arising from internal factors, such as risk management inefficiency or "bad management", should
be considered while risk generated by adverse local business conditions (“bad luck”) should be
excluded.
Second, the risk-adjusted efficiency literature relies on stock measures, usually in a cost
function context
7. This approach cannot capture the effect of asset quality on liabilities and asset
prices and therefore on efficiency. Risky borrowers typically pay a higher interest rate (asset price
effect) and, as noted by Hughes and Mester (1993), depositors wish to have a risk premium when
they put their money into a risky bank (liability price effect). These price effects only can be
captured by flow measures or by stock measures in a profit function context.
With the aim of addressing these problems this paper proposes a new sequential DEA
method to identify the internal and external sources of bank credit risk –measured by provision for
loan losses (PLL)-- from which we obtain appropriate risk-adjusted efficiency measures. This
procedure allows us to calculate, for each bank, the proportion of PLL due to poor risk
management and the proportion of PLL due economic/environmental factors
8. The second phase,
using the total amount of PLL exclusively due to internal factors, together with estimation of the
efficiency purged of environmental variables from a perspective of profits, allows us obtain
efficiency measures adjusted by risk and by environment factors, as well as to determine the
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influence on efficiency of adverse economic environment ("bad luck") and the influence of risk
management efficiency (“bad management”).
So, unlike B&D, instead of trying to obtain general conclusions, this paper tries to find the
causes of loan losses at the bank level (economic cycle or "bad luck" and risk management
inefficiency or “bad management”) and, unlike Hughes et al. (1993) and Mester (1994a, 1994b)
we obtain risk-adjusted efficiency measures by using a profit function approach, using flow
measures, and consider only that proportion of PLL associated with internal factors. Our analysis
is applied to the Spanish banking system in order to test whether the deregulation process
imposed by the European Community has affected banks’ conduct in terms of efficiency and risk.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some features of the Spanish
banking system while section 3 presents a review of the different methodologies used to
incorporate environmental variables in a DEA context. Additionally, section 3 describes the
procedure to calculate our risk management efficiency measures and decomposition of PLL.
Section 4 presents the data set as well as the model specification, which includes the influential
environmental while section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Spanish banking system: some features
The analysis and decomposition of loan losses and efficiency of Spanish banks is a relevant
question that, in spite of the important changes in terms of competition and deregulation that have
occurred during the past decade  as a consequence of the European directives has not been
previously analyzed (see table 1).7
Table 1 : Implementation of the EU deregulation process in the SBS
EU Directive Focus Year Implementation
into Spanish law
INTEREST RATE DE-REGULATION Conduct 1986-92
73/183 Freedom of establishment Structure 1973 1987
77/780 + 85/354 + 86/137 + 86/524 First Banking Directive Structure 1977 1987
1988-Article 67 of the EEC Treaty Liberalisation of capital
movements
Structure 1988 1992
89/117  Branch establishment & head offices outside EU Structure 1989 1993
89/299 + 92/16 Own funds directive Prudential 1989 1993
89/646  Second Banking Directive Conduct 1989 1994
89/647 +91/31 Solvency Ratio directives Prudential 1991 1993
91/308 Money Laundering directive Conduct 1991 1993
Though the structural liberalization of the Spanish banking system (SBS) was almost
complete in 1987 and the interest rates for most common banking products were deregulated,
competition between banks was, until the end of the decade, more "potential" than "real". Deposit
and loan interest rates were negligible and very few European banks began to do business in
Spain. However, in the last trimester of 1989 an extraordinarily competitive environment began to
develop. That year, Banco de Santander, one of the Spain’s largest banks, began to offer a "new"
product : a demand deposit account with a high interest rate. Other banks reacted quickly to meet
this product and, as a consequence, interest rates paid on deposits rose markedly (see graph 1).
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After pursuing deposits for a number of years, banks reduced their competition for
deposits and interest rates on deposits began to decrease (see graph 1). But competition did not
entirely cease : banks merely switched their focus to the asset side of the general ledger. It was
Banco de Santander again which, at the beginning of 1992, offered a new asset product, this time
a mortgage loan with a variable interest rate  that led to an overall decrease in interest rates on
loans. As before, other banks quickly reacted to this offensive, offering similar products. All these
actions produced a substantial decrease in interest income.
The consequence of this competitive environment was a decrease in financial margins.
However, some important questions rise: How did the competitive environment affect PLL? Did
it encourage banks to engage in riskier activities?. As seen in table 1, some of the EU directives
have been prudential and have been focus in risk control. The answer to these questions seems to
be negative if we observe the evolution of PLL in graph 1. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis is
necessary, since PLL are also affected by external factors that should be removed to obtain
accurate conclusions. The next sections show that different conclusions can be drawn when
external factors are considered.
3. Methodology
3.1. Incorporation of environmental variables
There are several procedures for including environmental variables in DEA (Rouse, 1996
and Fried and Lovell, 1996). These procedures can be classified into one-step, two-step and
three-step procedures. The one-step procedure is the most direct and easy method and consists in
jointly considering outputs, inputs and environmental variables and restricting the optimization
only to outputs and/or inputs in the analysis of units’ performance. The purpose is to restrict the
comparison set to those units subject to the same or worse environmental conditions. This9
procedure has an easy and direct interpretation. However, it has the drawback that the direction
of the influence of each variable must be known a priori
9.
The most common two-step method tries to explain traditional efficiency scores obtained
in a first-step by means of an ex post regression in terms of the set of environmental variables
10.
This method fails to generate adjusted efficiency measures on the (0,1] interval. However Pastor
(1995a) proposed an alternative two-step method based on the use of DEA on inputs (or outputs)
and environmental variables in the first-step. He proposes using the radial expanded inputs (or
radial expanded outputs) to remove the effect of environmental variables. This procedure does
generate efficiency measures on the (0,1] interval.
Finally Fried and Lovell (1996) propose a three-step procedure. In the first stage, they use
a traditional DEA model including only output and input variables. In the second-step, they use
either a DEA or a parametric stochastic frontier model to attribute the units’ performance to
environmental effects (external factors) and managerial efficiency (internal factors). To do this,
they apply a parametric stochastic frontier (PSF) or DEA analysis, with the aim of obtaining
slacks purged of environmental effects. These purged slacks are used to adjust the current inputs
(or outputs). Finally, in the third step they use the adjusted inputs (or adjusted outputs) to obtain
an efficiency measure purged of environmental effects.
In this paper, as in Lozano, Pastor and Pastor  (1996), a one-step method is used. While
we must know in advance the influence of each environmental factor, this is not a serious problem
since the direction of the influence of each variable on the PLL is well known a priori
11.
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3.2. Risk management efficiency and PLL  decomposition: Phase 1
As described in section 1, the provisions for bank loan losses (PLL) arise from two main
causes: internal and external factors. The first is associated with poor risk management, risk
aversion, risk policy, etc. The second is associated with the general economic circumstances of
the region where banks do their business. The principal difference between these two causes
resides in their discretionality. While banks can reduce PLL by improving their management or
modifying their risk policy, they are not able to reduce PLL due to external factors. So the proper
risk management efficiency measure should be calculated by removing the effect of external
factors so they are not attributed to managerial inefficiency.
This section describes the method, based on DEA technique, we use to estimate risk
management efficiency and to decompose total PLL into internal and external components. The
procedure consists of comparing each bank with a linear combination of banks that, with an equal
(or larger) amount of loans and being subject to equal (or worse) environmental conditions
(economic cycle), have less (or an equal) amount of PLL. Since we control for external factors,
the quotient of each bank’s PLL to the PLL of the reference bank give us the potential reduction
of PLL that could be done without reducing the amount of loans, given the environmental factors.
We call this measure “risk management efficiency” and it can be obtained by solving the following
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where N  is the number of banks (i=1,..,N), l L  is a vector containing the non-negative weights,
PLLi is the amount of provision for loan losses, Li is the amount of loans, and
() == = = LL L 3 L
++ + + = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ and  () == = = LL L 4 L
-- - - = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  are the vectors of environmental conditions11
(business cycle) with a positive or negative influence, respectively
12. The optimum solution, g M
￿ ,
gives us the proportion of PLL that bank j could reduce without altering its amount of loans. If,
g M =￿, this means that it is not possible to find a bank or a linear combination of banks, that with
equal (or greater) volume of loans and equal (or worse) external economic conditions, has a lower
value of PLL than bank j. In this case, all PLL would then  be due to external factors and bank j
would be risk management efficient. In general, g M £￿, and smaller values of g M  means larger
proportions of PLL are attributed to internal factors. Thus g M  offers us a measure of the
proportion of PLL for bank j that is due to external factors and ￿-g M a measure of the proportion
of PLL due to internal factors or risk management inefficiency.
3.3. Efficiency measurement and decomposition : Phase 2
The efficiency measures, as in problem (1), are obtained by comparing each bank with a
linear combination of efficient banks. The efficiency measures under constant returns to scale
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where  () \\ \ \ LL L5 L = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  is the output vector,  () [[ [ [ LL L 6 L = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  is the input vector.
Solving (2) for each one of the N banks of the sample, N weighs and N optimum solutions are
found. Each optimum solution, y M
￿
 is the efficiency indicator of bank j and, by construction,
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satisfies y M
￿ £￿. Those banks with y M
￿ <￿ are considered inefficient, while those with y M
￿ = ￿ are
catalogued as efficient.
The assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) can be easily removed by adding the
restriction lL L
1 = å = ￿ ￿  on the problem (2). This model, proposed by Banker, et al. (1984), permits
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The comparison of efficiency measures of problems (2) and (3) provide us information
about scale efficiency. Thus, the ratio between y M  and J M  is a measure of the scale efficiency (SEj)
of bank j that is the result of deducting from total technical efficiency ￿￿ y M  the pure technical







This part of inefficiency is due to the fact that banks perform with a non-optimum size.
When SEj=1, the efficiency measure under CRS is equal to the one obtained under the assumption
of VRS, implying that bank j performs under constant returns to scale, so there are no scale
inefficiencies. In the other cases (SEj<1), bank j performs under non constant returns to scale (i.e.
increasing or decreasing).
Nevertheless, these traditional efficiency measures under VRS ￿￿ J M  do not consider risk. If
we want to consider risk as a undesirable quality we must reward (increasing their efficiency) those
banks that are good risk managers. To do so, we must take into account differences in the provision for13
loan losses (PLL), but only that portion of the PLL due to risk management efficiency. We call this
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in which only PLL of the bank due to internal factors, ￿￿ ￿-g MM 3//  are included. This risk
adjusted efficiency measure r j provides us a more suitable appraisal of the performance of banks
than occurs in Berg et al (1992), Hughes et al. (1993) or Mester (1994a, 1994b) since our risk-
adjusted efficiency measure penalizes only those banks that incur PLL due exclusively to poor risk
management policies (risk management inefficiency), rather than total PLL..
Comparing the non risk-adjusted efficiency measure ￿￿ J M  obtained in  problem  (3), to the
risk-adjusted efficiency measure ￿￿ r M  obtained in problem (5), allows us to measure the impact of
risk management efficiency on the bank’s j global efficiency (a measure of the premium). Thus,








Those banks with RE<1 are risk management efficient ￿￿ g =￿  or, even if they are risk
management inefficient ( ) g <1 , they manage risk better than their other costs (inputs) and are
seen as less risky. If, on the contrary, RE=1, it means the PLL restriction in the model has no
effect, indicating that banks manage risk badly and manage it even worse that their other costs and14
they are seen as more risky. For the banks with RE=1, including risk has no influence on their
efficiency. When RE<1, it means that including risk improves efficiency.
However, even if the efficiency measures obtained in (5) rL  are risk-adjusted, we still do
not have a truly adequate measure of efficiency. We need to further refine the measure by adding
the effect of external factors since structural and economic factors of the region where the banks
do business influence efficiency. A risk-adjusted efficiency measure purified by these external
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-- - - = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  are the vectors of environmental
conditions with positive or negative efficiency influence respectively
13. The optimal solution of the
problem () W M
￿  is the efficiency measure adjusted by risk and by the environmental factors, since
the comparison set of each bank is restricted to those banks subject to the same (or worse)
environment conditions.
As before, comparing risk-adjusted efficiency measures ￿￿ r  (problem (5)) to those
measures adjusted for risk and economic environment ￿￿ W  (problem (7)) provides  information
about the degree of influence of the environment on banks’ efficiency or what we call
“environment effect” (EE).
                                                       








However, the interpretation is different, since PLL due to internal factors have been
treated as a discretionary variable, while environmental variables have been treated as non-
discretionary variables. If EEj=1, it means that the environment is not unfavorable for bank j. On
the contrary, if EEj<1 this means that the environment is unfavorable since when it is compared
with other banks subject to the same environmental conditions, the efficiency measure improves.
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Expression (9) offers us information about the origins of the CRS efficiency measures. So
the changes of CRS efficiency measures ( ) y M  can be explained by changes in efficiency measures
adjusted by risk and environment ( ) W M , changes of environmental effect ( ) (( M , changes of risk
effect ( ) 5( M , and changes of scale effect ( ) 6( M .
3.4. Selection of external factors (environmental variables)
In problems (1) and (7) economic environment variables are used, only business cycle
variables in the first case and business cycle (Zi) and business cycle and structural economic
variables in the second (Qi). Since there are, a wide variety of variables that could influence PLL
and efficiency we attempt to determine the influence of each one thorough use of a stepwise
testing procedure proposed by Pastor et al. (1995a) and applied by Lozano et al. (1996).
Basically the procedure consists of introducing, one by one, each environmental variable
and determining the degree of influence of each by comparing the model with and without16
particular environmental variables. Each step calculates the ratio r is adopted and a given number
of firms have to have r less than the tolerance limit to conclude than the variable is influential.
Pastor et al. (1995a) define a non-parametric statistical test based on the binomial distribution to
determine if a variable is influential or not. If T is the number of units with r less than the tolerance
level, the corresponding probability level is [1-F(T-1)], with F being the corresponding binomial
distribution function to B(N,p). If the p-value is zero, or close to zero, the null hypothesis is
rejected and the added variable is determined to be influential. Once the influential variable is
determined, we include it in the model and repeat the above-noted procedure to see if other
influential variables can be found
14.
4. Data and variables
Previous Spanish banking studies indicate that a great similarity between banks and saving
banks exists, not only regarding efficiency, but also in terms of specialization
15. Because of this,
and to obtain a large sample of institutions, this paper considers banks and savings banks jointly.
All national banks and saving banks existing in the SBS were included
16. The number of
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banks has fallen considerably over time as a consequence of numerous mergers, mainly in the case
of saving banks (see table A.1.).
There is considerable disagreement in the current banking literature relative to the proper
definition of outputs and inputs. In this paper, in order to capture the impact of higher or smaller
risk on output and input prices, flow measures are used
17. Consequently, we have  selected two
outputs: y1  = financial revenues (interest), and collected fees, y2  = stock and bond portfolio
returns; and two inputs: x1 = financial costs, and x2 = operating expenses (see table A.1).
A set of environmental variables has been initially considered to capture the business cycle
influence that can influence PLL as well as efficiency. Other economic aspects related to bank
services’ demand and the degree of accessibility to bank services that can influence banks’
efficiency but are not directly related to the business cycle are specified (see table A.2.).
Since banks operate simultaneously in several regions, and since the economic
circumstances of the Spanish regions are very different, the influence of the economic
circumstances of a given region on each bank will be proportional to the banks’ activity in this
region. Although there is not much information about banks’ activity by region we can use
regional branch distribution as a proxy of banks’ activity in each region. The set of environmental
variables by regions has been weighted in order to obtain specific environmental variables per
each bank
18.
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EUDQFKHV SODFHG LQ HDFK UHJLRQ￿18Table A. 1 : Summary data
y1=Interest income y2=Stock&portof. ret. x1=Finnacial costs x2=Oper. Expenses PLL Number of firms
Sum Std Sum std um std Sum std Sum std S. banks Banks Total
1985 4,697,825.0 104,709.5 317,142.2 8,017.6 2,882,810.4 63,454.6 1,177,088.4 26,847.8 233,542.2 6,167.4 - 89 -
1986 5,666,512.2 70,487.1 703,795.3 8,866.4 3,563,692.3 43,305.9 1,748,016.8 21,292.4 233,051.4 2,805.4 77 88 165
1987 6,167,921.2 75,545.1 716,123.0 11,591.9 3,827,189.9 46,632.3 1,823,325.1 22,331.0 260,227.3 2,582.5 77 82 159
1988 6,454,844.8 89,957.5 698,353.8 13,378.2 3,841,057.2 51,845.7 1,891,908.4 25,924.9 316,000.5 5,515.0 77 80 157
1989 7,457,294.7 102,797.8 700,305.4 12,644.3 4,751,001.3 65,810.5 2,036,723.9 26,897.5 191,012.0 3,009.0 76 82 158
1990 8,342,425.7 123,920.2 689,349.6 13,421.1 5,586,051.9 88,546.2 2,162,525.2 31,025.2 182,179.6 2,560.2 65 73 138
1991 8,774,999.8 140,341.6 753,184.5 12,693.4 5,982,172.2 99,504.8 2,241,969.9 34,570.2 220,188.1 3,847.7 56 88 144
1992 7,878,000.9 129,135.6 1,434,350.0 24,133.8 5,977,452.6 102,017.9 2,346,629.4 36,429.6 151,465.5 2,056.6 53 88 141
1993 7,641,486.5 136,715.7 1,342,754.4 23,304.3 6,949,915.0 117,442.2 2,346,264.5 34,929.1 350,660.6 5,356.3 51 88 139
1994 7,778,313.3 121,494.1 1,555,026.5 26,571.2 5,886,548.0 98,116.0 2,466,816.6 36,688.3 257,874.9 2,763.3 51 84 135
1995 7,976,483.0 123,111.7 1,811,207.0 31,567.8 6,478,817.0 108,243.6 2,428,224.0 36,130.5 178,258.9 2,297.3 50 82 132Table A. 2 : Selected variables and description.
Disag. Description Observations
Bussines cycle variables
RGGNP Community Rate of growth of GNP in t-1 FIES-BBV
RGGNP5 Community Average rate of growth of GNP in last 5 years. Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) (2)
RGINV Community Average rate of growth of private investment in last 5 years. Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) (1)
RGPINV Community Average rate of growth of public investment in last 5 years. Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) (1)
UNEMP Province Rate of unemployment Capital humano, Series Históricas, 1964-91 (BANCAJA) and INE (3)
UNEMP1 Province Rate of unemployment in t-1 Capital humano, Series Históricas, 1964-91 (BANCAJA) and INE (3)
RGUNEMP Province Rate of growth of unemployment Capital humano, Series Históricas, 1964-91 (BANCAJA) and INE (3)
RGUNEMP5 Province Average rate of growth of unemployement in last 5 years. Capital humano, Series Históricas, 1964-91 (BANCAJA) and INE (3)
VUNEMP Community Variance of the rate of unemployment within year. Banco de España
VUNEMP1 Community Variance of the rate of unemployment within t-1 year. Banco de España
Other economic environmental variables
INV/INH Community Private investment per person Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and  INE (1)
INV/KM2 Community Private investment per square kilometer Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and An. Est. de Esp.(1994) (1)
PINV/INH Community Public investment per person Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and INE. (1)
PINV/KM2 Community Public investment per square kilometer Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and An. Est. de Esp. (1994) (1)
GNPP/INH Province GNP per person Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and An. Est. de Esp. (1994) (2)
GNPP/KM2 Province GNP per square kilometer. Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and INE (2)
GNP/INH Community GNP per person Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and INE. (2)
GNP/KM2 Community GNP per square kilometer. FIES-BBV and Anuario Estadístico de España (1994).
BRA/INH Province Branches per person Banco de España and INE.
BRA/KM2 Province Branches per square kilometer Banco de España and Anuario Estadístico de España (1994)
RGGNPP5 Province Average rate of growth of GNP in last 5 years. Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986). (2)
ENTROPY Community Diversification index of bank branches CSB and CECA (1)
OJIVE Province Diversification index of bank branches CSB and CECA
SENTROPY Province Sector diversification index by sectors (4 sectors) Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and own preparation (2)
SOJIVE Province Sector diversification index by sectors (4 sectors) Contabilidad Regional de España (Base 1986) and own preparation (2)
(1)   1993-95 values are projections
(2)   1994-95 values are projections
(3)   1993-95 community levelInitially, rate of growth of GNP (RGGNP), average rate of growth of GNP in last five
years (RGGNP5) and private and public investment rate of growth (RGINV and RGPINV) were
considered. These variables negatively impact loan losses and positively effect efficiency, since
those banks placed in regions with a favorable economic cycle have lower delinquency rates and
greater bank services demand. Greater unemployment rates (UNEMP) or lagged unemployment
rates (UNEMP1), greater unemployment rate of growth (RGUNEMP) or the average rate growth
in last five years (RGUNEMP5), and  the variance of the unemployment rate within that year
(VUNEMP) or of the prior period (VUNEMP1), positively influence delinquency rates and have a
negative impact on efficiency.
Similarly, higher private investment levels per person (INV/INH) or per squared kilometer
(INV/KM2), higher public investment per person (PINV/INH) or per squared kilometer
(PINV/KM2), higher GNP per person (GNP/INH) or per squared kilometer (GNP/KM2), are
thought to have a positive influence on the efficiency, given the greater banking services demand.
On the other hand, banks in regions with a larger number of branches per person (BRA/INH) or
per squared kilometer (BRA/KM2) are faced with increased competition and offer more
accessibility of services, causing efficiency to fall due to higher operating costs
19.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Risk management efficiency and PLL decomposition
Results of the stepwise procedure explained in section 3 are shown in table 2. Ten
influential business cycle variables were initially considered as influencing PLL (problem (1)).
After five steps, only four were found to be statistically significant. These were: the volatility of
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the unemployment (VUNEMP), the average rate of growth over the last five years of
unemployment (RGUNEMP5), the GNP rate of growth (RGGNP), and the unemployment rate
(UNEMP).
Table 2 : P-values stepwise procedure (*)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
No. P-value No. P-value No. P-value No. P-value No. P-value
RGGNP 49 1.000 59 0.978 177 9.91E-25 ----
RGGNP5 19 1.000 65 0.897 91 0.046 145 3.77E-14 80 0.237
RGINV 114 2.03E-05 160 9.28E-19 174 1.55E-23 188 1.31E-30 93 0.017
RGPINV 9 1.000 45 1.000 133 6.51E-10 131 5.02E-10 75 0.476
UNEMP 24 1.000 79 0.338 152 1.41E-15 206 5.33E-39 --
UNEMP1 8 1.000 64 0.918 129 7.09E-09 98 3.72E-03 52 0.998
RGUNEMP 96 0.014 98 0.005 139 1.42E-11 118 8.16E-07 71 0.663
RGUNEMP5 111 7.46E-05 201 8.16E-
36
------
VUNEMP 115 1.29E-05 - 1 . 0 0 0 ------







(*) Most significant influence underlined. T is  the number of firms with "r" less than the tolerance level used to
obtain the p-value of the binomial distribution.
Simple and weighted average measures of risk management efficiency in terms of problem
(1) including these four significant business cycle variables (Zi) for each one of the eleven years
are shown in graph 2. Banks’ risk management efficiency significantly improved between 1985-
92. In 1992 risk management efficiency begins to fall, indicating that competition for loans
between banks from 1992 appears to have had a negative impact. This feature contrasts with the
evolution of loan losses ratio (graph 1).23
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Graphs 3 (i) and 3 (ii) show the evolution of risk management efficiency using a number of
alternative approaches: the one-stage procedure used in this paper, Pastor’s two-stage procedure
and two versions of the three-stage procedure of Fried and Lovell (1996) which use a DEA or a
parametric stochastic frontier (PSF). The one-stage and three-stage procedures generate a very
similar fluctuation in results over time and differ only in their level. The PSF three-stage
procedure also produces very similar levels of efficiency compared with the one-stage procedure
we use in this paper. However Pastor’s (1995a) two-stage procedure produces very different
results
20.
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Simple average risk management efficiency is lower than weighted average measures in all
the procedures. This is expected and means that the greater a bank’s size, the higher the risk
management efficiency. Several reasons may explain the higher efficiency of large banks. First,
large banks located nation-wide have more opportunities to diversify by economic sector and
geographical region. In addition, large banks are likely to have greater access to information than25
smaller ones and they have internal departments specifically dedicated to appraising the risk
associated with loan applications.
If we interpret risk management efficiency as the proportion of PLL that could be reduced,
given external factors, this measure offers us the proportion of PLL exclusively due to internal
factors. So, large banks have a lower proportion of PLL due to internal factors than smaller ones.
Graph 4 shows the break-down of PLL of the weighted average. In general, around 40% of PLL
is attributable to internal factors. However, the results are quite different if we look at PLL by
period. In this case, we find that from 1985-92 the proportion of PLL due to internal factors is
continuously decreasing due to the improvement in risk management efficiency. In 1992,
however, this proportion began to increase as competition for loans caused banks to lower their
risk management standards.












Graph 5 presents the growth and decomposition of total PLL. Although a clear trend does
not exist, PLL seems particularly high in 1988, 1991 and 1993, when economic conditions were
less favorable than in other years. Thus, if we compare the evolution of the rate of growth of GNP
in real terms (with the sign changed), a close correlation between economic cycle and loan26
delinquency can be seen. Moreover, the “erratic” fluctuation of total and external PLL during this
period, can be almost completely explained by economic circumstances beyond banks’ control.
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Graph 6 shows the proportion of PLL due to external factors by bank asset size. As shown
graph 2, there is a positive relationship between size and risk management efficiency. Specifically,
of the four bank sizes, the largest banks (with volume of assets above 2,000 billion pesetas or $15
billion) are the best risk managers, since the majority of PLL are due to external factors (in 1992
only 8% of the PLL were due to risk management efficiency for these banks).27
*UDSK ￿￿ 3URSRUWLRQ RI 3// GXH WR H[HUQDO IDFWRUV E\ VL]HV￿
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Table 3 : P-values stepwise procedure (*)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
No. P-value No. P-value No. P-value
RGINV 434 0.000 219 1.77E-44 --
RGPINV 429 0.000 110 6.81E-05 55 0.952
RGGNP 582 0.000 38 1.000 15 1.000
RGGNP5 631 0.000 59 0.980 18 1.000
INV/INH 649 0.000 49 1.000 34 1.000
INV/KM2 774 0.000 14 1.000 9 1.000
PINV/INH 649 0.000 61 0.963 25 1.000
PINV/KM2 741 0.000 27 1.000 10 1.000
VUNEMP 434 0.000 56 0.992 24 1.000
VUNEMP1 426 0.000 56 0.992 27 1.000
GNP/KM2 835 0.000 ----
GNPP/KM2 662 0.000 41 1.000 30 1.000
BRA/INH 424 0.000 42 1.000 27 1.000
BRA/KM2 417 0.000 1 1.000 0 1.000
UNEMP 422 0.000 36 1.000 14 1.000
UNEMP1 419 0.000 31 1.000 12 1.000
RGUNEMP 430 0.000 55 0.995 15 1.000
RGUNEMP5 417 0.000 102 1.51E-03 50 0.990
(*) Most significant influence underlined. T is  the number of banks with "r" less
than the tolerance level used to obtain the p-value of the binomial distribution.28
5.2. Selection of environmental variables and adjusted efficiency measures
The results of the forward stepwise procedure regarding the environmental variables
included in problem (7) are shown in table 3. A set of eighteen variables were initially considered.
After three steps, only two variables were statistically significant for efficiency: the GNP per
square kilometer (GNP/KM2) and private investment rate of growth (RGINV).
The efficiency measures under CRS (problem (2), VRS (problem (3)), adjusted by risk
(problem (5)) and adjusted by risk and environmental factors (problem  (7)) are shown in table 4
and graph 7.Unlike the CRS efficiency measure, VRS efficiency measure does not change
significantly, indicating that changes in regulation and increases in competition have had a little
impact on efficiency. Average risk adjusted efficiency measures (column 3) are  similar to
unadjusted ones (column 2) indicating that the risk effect does not significantly affect to the
average level of the efficiency.. Average risk and environment adjusted efficiency measures are
much more stable. The results reflect that when risk and environment effects are purged, both
competition and deregulation do not seem to have any important impact on banks’ efficiency.
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1985 84.574 88.033 90.240 93.670
1986 83.683 87.472 89.367 92.108
1987 82.549 85.782 87.592 89.415
1988 76.991 85.925 87.679 89.475
1989 80.378 85.671 89.160 91.492
1990 81.930 85.941 88.873 90.971
1991 76.838 85.275 87.882 90.429
1992 65.620 75.230 79.171 87.002
1993 64.859 79.241 82.367 87.237
1994 63.631 83.461 84.689 88.573
1995 81.925 86.052 87.000 90.717
The efficiency decomposition in terms of expression (9) is shown in table 5. Basically,
since 1989 the increase loan competition caused efficiency (CRS) to fall as a consequence of an
increase in financial costs (1989-93) and a decrease in revenues (1992-95). This fact can be
explained almost completely by a decrease in scale efficiency (SE). This means that larger banks
have been more affected by competition for deposits (1989-92) and for loans (1993-95) than
small banks. The environmental effect (EE) is very stable and close to one. But in 1992-1994
environmental variables appear to have had more impact on efficiency due to adverse economic
circumstances. The risk effect (RE) is also very stable. The portion of PLL due to internal factors
does not have a high impact on average efficiency, since RE is very close to one. The average of
RE all over the period is 97%. This means that banks seem to manage risk worse than other types
of costs. This is especially significant in 1992, when the loan market competition began
21.
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1985 84.574 93.670 96.423 97.636 96.196
1986 83.683 92.108 97.178 97.892 95.807
1987 82.549 89.415 98.037 97.991 96.347
1988 76.991 89.475 98.029 97.947 89.995
1989 80.378 91.492 97.523 96.203 94.212
1990 81.930 90.971 97.818 96.786 95.314
1991 76.838 90.429 97.266 96.885 90.378
1992 65.620 87.002 91.587 94.728 87.144
1993 64.859 87.237 94.811 96.068 82.033
1994 63.631 88.573 95.921 98.546 76.045
1995 81.925 90.717 96.169 98.877 95.496
6. Conclusions
The current banking literature has made only a few attempts to analyze how risk can affect
measured and how it can affect bank efficiency. Attempts made to date have two main drawbacks.
First, they do not distinguish between risk that arises from environmental factors that are
essentially beyond the control of ban management versus risk factors associated with internal
management actions. As a result, current measures of efficiency can be misstated and will penalize
improperly those banks subject to adverse economic conditions by attributing it to poor
management rather than external conditions. Second, they typically use stock measures, usually in
a cost function context. This approach cannot capture the effect of asset quality on liabilities and
asset prices. These price effects only can be captured by flow measures or by stock measures in a
profit function context.31
To address this problem a new sequential DEA procedure is proposed using flow
measures of outputs and inputs in a profit function framework. In addition, we use provision for
loan losses (PLL) as a comprehensive measure of risk. The first phase estimates the risk
management efficiency of each bank. Using this indicator, total PLL are broken down into those
due to internal factors and those due to the external environment. In the second phase, risk-
adjusted efficiency measures and risk and environmental adjusted efficiency measure are obtained
including only that portion of PLL due to internal factors and PLL due to internal factors and
environmental influence respectively. This procedure is illustrated by application to the Spanish
banking system (SBS) to see if the banking deregulation process there has affected banks’ risk
behavior.
A large set of business cycle variables were initially considered as risk influential, but  only
four were found to be statistically significant using Pastor’s (1995a) procedure. Including these
four variables in the first phase, risk management efficiency was calculated using three alternative
approaches. The results show that these approaches produce similar results to the one used in this
paper. Risk management efficiency in the SBS has improved significantly over the period 1985-
92, consequently the proportion of PLL due to internal factors has decreased. So it seems that
credit restrictions imposed by the Banco de España with the aim to discourage private
consumption, encouraged banks to be more careful in making loans, accepting less risky
customers (credit rationing). However, from 1992, risk management efficiency began to decrease
as a consequence of the increase in competition in loan markets, leading to an increase in the
proportion of PLL due to internal factors. In this instance, deregulation has negatively affected
bank risk.
In the second phase, eighteen environmental variables were examined as influential to the
efficiency, from which only two were found to be statistically significant. The efficiency measures
under CRS, CRS, adjusted by risk and adjusted by risk and environmental factors were calculated.
Except for the CRS efficiency measures, the remaining efficiency indicators have not changed32
significantly. Moreover, the decomposition of the efficiency measures under CRS provides
information about the sources of efficiency.33
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